主题：Lectures in Mechanism design
主讲人：Debasis Mishra, Indian Statistical Institute
主持人：西南财经大学经济学院 杨再福 教授
Debasis Mishra is a Professor in Economics in Indian Statistical Institute, India. He completed his PhD in Industrial Engineering in University of Wisconsin, Madison. His research focuses on theory of auctions and mechanism design, social choice theory, and game theory. He has published several papers on Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory, and other leading journals.
Title 1: Mechanism design: Basic definitions and efficiency
In this talk, we introduce mechanism design and discuss various preliminary results. We will discuss revelation principle and a benchmark impossibility result by Gibbard and Satterthwaite. Then, we will show the power of domain restrictions. In particular, we will see how environments involving monetary transfers and a particular form of preference allows you to get several possibilities in terms of achieving efficiency.
Title 2: Mechanism design: single object allocation
In this talk, we will get into various models of allocating a single object. We will discuss Myerson's optimal auction, Green-Laffont impossibility, Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility results. We will discuss the power of property rights in this environment. In the process, we will layout basic tools for designing mechanisms.
Title 3: Mechanism design: multidimensional private information
In this talk, we will see how the template of designing single object mechanisms can be extended when the private information of agents involve multiple dimensions. We will prove general revenue equivalence results and discuss the role of monotone allocation rules.