主题：On the Role of Realtime Leaderboards in Dynamic Research Tournaments
主讲人：Bo Chen, Southern Methodist University
Bo Chen is an Associate Professor in Economics in Southern Methodist University, USA. He completed his PhD in University of Wisconsin – Madison. His research focuses on game theory, contract theory, mechanism design, and industrial organization. He has published several papers on American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory, and other leading journals.
This paper studies information disclosure in research tournaments. We analyze a multi-agent winner-takes-all tournament in which each agent decides when to stop a privately observed search for innovations. Each agent makes a one-time submission of her best discovery to the organizer before a deadline. The tournament ends when submissions are made from all agents, and the agent with the best innovation wins. The tournament organizer chooses between a public policy where all previous submissions are immediately revealed to the public, and a hidden policy where all submissions are revealed to the public after the organizer receives all submissions from the agents. We analyze the agents’ equilibrium behavior under the two disclosure policies. We find that the disclosure policy drastically affects the agents’ equilibrium search behavior. In particular, information can be a double-edged sword: The organizer strictly prefers to immediately reveal a submission from a stopping agent for research tournaments with long horizons, in that such research tournaments induce more intensive search behavior from the agents in equilibrium. However, the organizer can strictly prefer hiding the submission information from all the agents when the horizon is short, in that information about the submitted agents' can induce the agents to stop too early, hurting the organizer ex ante.